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Doherty: Doherty: Antipsychotic Medication and the Criminal Defendant

Antipsychotic Medication and the Criminal

Defendant: Problems Persist Despite
a Dose of Due Process
Riggins v. Nevada'
"Our whole constitutional heritage rebels2 at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds."
I. INTRODUCTION

Medical treatment of severe mental illness was revolutionized in the mid1950s when researchers introduced antipsychotic drugs.3 Antipsychotic drugs,
also known as "neuroleptics" or "psychotropic drugs,"4 proved to be very
effective for treating mental disorders such as schizophrenia.5 These drugs
affect thought processes by altering the chemical balance in the brain. The
drugs do not cure the illness but they do eliminate the most serious symptoms
of schizophrenia, such as auditory and visual hallucinations, and they restore
normal thought processes."
Along with the benefits of antipsychotic drugs there can be hazardous
side effects.7 The most common side effects are extra-pyramidal symptoms-temporary muscular reactions which only exist during treatment with
antipsychotic drugs.8 These symptoms include dystonic reactions, akasthesia,
1. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
2. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
3. Thomas G. Gutheil, M.D. & Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D., "Mind Control," "Synthetic

Sanity," "Artficial Competence" and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of
Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HoFsTRA L. REv. 77, 99-100 (1983); see also Robert Plotkin,
Limiting the TherapeuticOrgy: MentalPatients'Rightto Refuse Treatment,72 Nw. U. L. REv.
461, 475-77 (1978). The most commonly prescribed antipsychotic drugs are Thorazine
(chloropromazine), Mellaril (thioridazine), Prolixin (fluphenazine), Haldol (aloperidol) and
Stelazine (trifluoperazine). Steve Tomashefsky, Comment, Antipsychotic DrugsandFitness to
Stand Trial: The Right of the Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 773, 773
n.3 (1985).
4. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 (1990).
5. Schizophrenia is defined as "a common type of psychosis, characterized by a disorder in
the thinking processes, such as delusions and hallucinations, and extensive withdrawal of the
individual's interest from other people and the outside world, and the investment of it in his
own." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1390 (25th ed. 1990).
6. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 3, at 101.
7. See Catherine E. Blackburn, The "TherapeuticOrgy"andthe "Rightto Rot" Collide: The
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 447, 508-13 (1990).
8. Plotkin, supra note 3, at 475.
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and Parkinsonisms.9 Antipsychotic drugs can also cause nonmuscular side
effects such as drowsiness, weakness, apathy, depression, and occasionally,
sudden death. 0 Arguably, the most dangerous side effect is tardive dyskinesia," which persists after the drugs are discontinued and has no known
12
cure.
Despite their detrimental side effects, these drugs are widely used because
of their effectiveness. However, the right of involuntarily committed mental
patients to refuse forced treatment with these drugs has been an area of
widespread litigation, showing that not every person who suffers from a
mental illness wants to risk the side effects to enjoy the benefits of antipsychotic medication. 3
Involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs also raises difficult legal
issues within the domain of criminal law. Because antipsychotic drugs affect
thought processes, when psychiatrists acting on behalf of the state administer
these drugs to a criminal defendant, the state is controlling that defendant's
mind to some extent. In Riggins v. Nevada,4 the United States Supreme
Court recognized constitutional protection against involuntarily treating pretrial
detainees with antipsychotic drugs. This Note will analyze the Court's
decision and discuss unresolved problems concerning the effects of antipsychotic medication on the criminally accused.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On November 20, 1987, David Riggins visited Paul Wade in Wade's Las
Vegas, Nevada apartment.15 Later that day, Wade was discovered dead from
multiple7 stab wounds. 6 Police later arrested Riggins for the murder of
Wade.'

9. Dystonic reactions are characterized by involuntary muscle movements ofthe neck, face,

and arms, spasms of the eye muscles, and protrusion of the tongue. Id.; Blackburn, supra note
7, at 508-09. Akasthesia is characterized by restlessness and the inability to stay still. Plotkin,
supranote 3, at 475. Parkinsonism is characterized by tremors, muscle stiffness, mask-like faces
and drooling. Id.
10. Plotkin, supranote 3, at 476.
11. Tardive dyskinesia is characterized by involuntary muscle movements of lips and
tongue, difficulties with speech, swallowing, and breathing. Id. at 476-77.
12. Id. at 477; Blackburn, supra note 7, at 509.
13. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.
1983) (en bane).
14. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
15. Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 537 (Nev. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Within a week of Riggins' incarceration, he complained to Dr. R. Edward
Quass, a psychiatrist, that he was experiencing auditory hallucinations and
insomnia. 8 Dr. Quass prescribed the drug Mellaril 9 at a level of 100
milligrams per day.2" Since that amount proved to be ineffective for
eliminating Riggins' symptoms, the dosage of Mellaril was gradually increased
over the next year to 800 milligrams per day.2
After being judged competent to stand trial,' Riggins moved for an
order from the district court to terminate the treatment with Mellaril until the

end of his trial.'

Riggins alleged that continued administration of the drug

would deny him due process because the drug would affect his demeanor and
mental state at trial.' The State responded that because Nevada law'
prohibited trying an incompetent person, the court had the authority to force

Riggins to take medication to insure his competence.26 After a July hearing,
the court denied Riggins' motion to terminate medication, but gave no
indication of its reasoning.27 Riggins continued to receive Mellaril against
his wishes.28
At trial, while receiving 800 milligrams of Mellaril per day, Riggins
asserted the insanity defense and testified in his own defense.29 He claimed
that during a fight with Wade, voices in his head convinced him that killing
Wade was justifiable homicide.3" Because Riggins was not allowed to be
taken off Mellaril and show his natural demeanor, Riggins presented expert

18. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
19. Mellaril is the trade name for the antipsychotic drug thioridazine. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id
22. In February and March of 1988, Riggins was examined by three court-appointed
psychiatrists. Id. Dr. William O'Gorman and Dr. Franklin Master found Riggins competent to
stand trial. Id. Dr. Jack Jurasky found Riggins incompetent. Id. The Clark County District
Court found Riggins legally sane and competent to stand trial. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. NEv.REv. STAT. § 178.400 (1989). This section reads:
(1) A person may not be tried, adjudged to punishment or punished for a public
offense while he is incompetent.
(2) For the purposes of this section, "incompetent" means that the person is not of
sufficient mentality to be able to understand the nature of the criminal charges
against him, and because of that insufficiency, is not able to aid and assist his
counsel in the defense interposed upon the trial or against the pronouncement of the
.judgment thereafter.

Id.
26. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
27. Id. at 1813.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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testimony to inform the jury about the effects of Mellaril on Riggins'
courtroom demeanor and testimony.3 The jury found Riggins guilty of
32
murder and sentenced him to death.
Riggins appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Nevada
Supreme Court. Riggins asserted that the involuntary treatment with Mellaril
denied him a full and fair trial because it adversely affected his ability to assist
in his own defense and to present his natural demeanor to the jury.3 The
Nevada Supreme Court conceded that a defendant's demeanor at trial has
probative value when sanity is at issue, 34 but ruled that the medical testimony
about the effects of the drug on Riggins' testimony and demeanor was an
acceptable substitute for suspending the treatment with Mellaril s Thus, the
court found that Riggins received a full and fair trial, 36 and accordingly

affirmed Riggins' conviction and sentence.37 Riggins appealed, and the

United States Supreme Court granted certiorari3
The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause requires that a state show
overriding justification for any intrusion into a criminal defendant's constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs. 9
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Tort law has long recognized that nonemergency medical treatment
rendered by a physician without the patient's informed consent or which
exceeded the consent given is actionable as a battery.4 ° When such medical
treatment is given by physicians acting on behalf of the state, the constitutional protection of the Due Process Clause also becomes involved.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Riggins, 808 P.2d at 537.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 543; see also State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (S.C. 1978). Contra
Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983) (holding medical testimony
about drug's effects on demeanor not acceptable substitute for defendant's natural demeanor).
36. Riggins, 808 P.2d at 538.
37. Id.

38. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct. 49 (1991).
39. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
40. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562,564 (111. 1906); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12,
15 (Minn. 1905); Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Mo. CL App. 1983); Wells v. Van
Nort, 125 N.E. 910, 910-11 (Ohio 1919); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/4
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of law."4 Ostensibly, this clause only addresses the procedures a state may
employ to deprive persons of life, liberty, or property. However, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process Clause protects
substantive personal interests beyond the framework of the procedures used
to infringe upon them.42
Although the term "liberty" is ambiguous, the most familiar of the
substantive liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause are those
embodied in the Bill of Rights.43 The Court has held that the Due Process

Clause incorporates most of the substantive liberty interests protected by the
Bill of Rights." Nevertheless, the full extent of due process protection is not
limited to that.found in the Bill of Rights. Also within the scope of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause is the liberty to make those choices

which are "central to personal dignity and autonomy."45 Such constitutionally protected decisions include decisions involving marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.'

Another personal decision the United States Supreme Court found worthy
of due process protection is the decision to refuse medical treatment.
Beginning with Jacobson v. Massachusetts,47 the Court recognized a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.48 However, the Court never explicitly addressed the right to
refuse involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs until Washington v.
49

Harper.

41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2804 (1992) ("Although
a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State
may deprive persons of liberty, . . . the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive
component as well, one 'barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them."') (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
43. Id.
44. Id.; see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). Only the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of a grand jury, and the Second, Third, and Seventh Amendments
have not been incorporated by the Due Process Clause. GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL.,
CoNsTrtrrToNAL LAW 784 (2d ed. 1991).

45. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2807.
46. Id at 2797; see, e.g., ia (right to abortion); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (right of family members to live together); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right to use contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of parents
to direct upbringing and education of their child); Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right
to acquire and teach useful knowledge).
47. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
48. Ia at 24-30 (balancing individual's liberty interest in refusing an unwanted smallpox
vaccine against the State's interest in preventing disease).
49. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). In Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982), the Court assumed
that such a liberty interest existed because both sides admitted it.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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In Harper,the Court held that the Due Process Clause protects the right
to be free from involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs.5 ° The Court
recognized that involuntary medical treatment represents a "substantial
interference with that person's liberty."'" Therefore, a person possesses "a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend2
ment.0
However, merely determining that a person has a liberty interest in being
free from involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs does not end the
analysis under the Due Process Clause. To determine whether a person's
constitutional rights have been violated, that person's liberty interest must be
weighed against relevant state interests.53
In Harper,the Court developed a constitutional standard for administering antipsychotic drugs to prisoners against their will. The Court held that
any infringement on the prisoner's liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
medical treatment could only be justified by showing that "the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical
interest."54 The Court noted that states have a legitimate penological interest
in maintaining safety in the prison environment; this interest could outweigh
a prisoner's liberty interest in being free from involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs. 5 The Court then ruled that the state procedures for
administering involuntary medication were sufficient to insure that the
prisoner's interest was balanced against the state interest."

However, the due process standards stated by the Court in Harperapply
only to inmates who are involuntarily treated with antipsychotic drugs.
According to O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,57 "prison regulations alleged to
infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less
restrictive than the test ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of

50. Harper,494 U.S. at 221-22.
51. Id. at 229.
52. Id. at 221-22.
53. Cruzanv. Director, Mo. Dep'tofHealth, 497 U.S. 261,279 (1990) (quoting Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
54. Harper,494 U.S. at 227.
55. Id. at 225-26.
56. Id. at 227. The procedures for involuntary medication were a policy of the Special
Offender Center (SOC), a center designed to treat convicted felons with serious mental disorders.
Id at 214. SOC Policy § 600.30 provided the regulations for involuntary medical treatment.
Id. at 215. Section 600.30 provided for involuntary treatment only after a psychiatrist finds the
inmate has a mental disorder and the inmate is gravely disabled or there is a likelihood of serious
harm to himself, others, or their property. Id. An inmate who refused to voluntarily take the
medication was entitled to a hearing, and treatment could continue only with periodic review.
Id. at 215-16..
57. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/4
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fundamental constitutional rights."58 Therefore, those who have not been
convicted of a crime may be entitled to higher standards of constitutional
protection.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 9 the Court addressed the constitutional rights of
pretrial detainees-those persons who have been charged with a crime and
incarcerated, but have not yet been tried for that crime.' In Wolfish, the
Court rejected the notion that because the criminally accused are "innocent
until proven guilty," pretrial detainees have the same constitutional rights as
other citizens. 61 The Court stated that the presumption of innocence is just
a doctrine which "allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials."'62 The
presumption may be used to warn the jury to disregard any suspicions about
the defendant from the defendant's arrest and indictment so as to base their
verdict only on the evidence produced at trial.63 This presumption, however,
has no application in determining the rights of a pretrial detainee.' 4
Although the Wolfish Court refused to grant pretrial detainees the same
constitutional protection as other citizens, the Court noted that even convicted
prisoners retain some constitutional rights.65 Accordingly, the Court held
that pretrial detainees retain at least the same constitutional rights enjoyed by
convicted prisoners, but that these retained rights must be balanced against
relevant state interests.' The Court noted that the government has a strong
interest in detaining the criminally accused to ensure his or her presence at
trial.6' This detention necessarily brings about the withdrawal or limitation
of rights to promote the "central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security."6 Therefore, a pretrial detainee may be subject to
the "restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those
conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment."'69
In Bee v. Greaves,7 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed
the Wolfish standard when it considered the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs to a pretrial detainee.7 The Bee court noted that

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 349.
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Id. at 523.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 533.

63. Id
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 536-37.
744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).

71. Id at 1391.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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although pretrial detainees do "not possess the full range of freedom of an
unincarcerated individual," they retain at least those constitutional rights
enjoyed by convicted prisoners. 2 The court found that a pretrial detainee
had a First Amendment liberty interest in avoiding antipsychotic medication"' The court ruled that a criminal defendant's liberty interest in not
being forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs should be weighed against
the state's interest in treating the detainee's medical needs and protecting the
safety of the detainee and others.74 However, the court added an additional
factor not included in the standards announced in Harper.5 The court added
that due to the serious possible side effects of antipsychotic drugs, involuntary
administration of these drugs could be justified to control a detainee's
behavior only after alternatives had been considered.76 Possible alternatives
suggested by the court included the use of segregation or less controversial
drugs such as tranquilizers or sedatives to protect the safety of the detainee
and others.'
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Riggins v. Nevada,78 by a seven to two decision, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that involuntary treatment by antipsychotic drugs
violated a defendant's due process rights because the State did not show an
overriding justification for intruding on a criminal defendant's liberty interest
in freedom from unwanted medication. 9
The majority began its analysis by reviewing the Harper case, 80 in
which the Court held that the Due Process Clause protects an inmate's right
to be free from involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs." For an
inmate to be administered antipsychotic drugs against his will, due process
requires the state to show overriding justification, such as a showing that the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's
medical interest.8 2 The Court then referred to the holding of Bell v.
Wolfish' that pretrial detainees retain at least the same constitutional rights

72. Id at 1394 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 546).
73. Id at 1395.

74. Id
75. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
76. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1396.

77. Id.
78. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).

79. Id. at 1817.
80. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).

81. Id. at 229.
82. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
83. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/4
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as those convicted of a crime." Therefore, the majority reasoned, in order
to administer antipsychotic drugs to a pretrial detainee against his will, the
Due Process Clause requires the state to show that the medication can be
justified by an overriding state interest.85
Although the Court stated that it did not have the opportunity to dictate
substantive standards, the Court asserted that due process would be satisfied
if a state shows that the detainee is a safety risk to himself and others and that
after considering less intrusive means, treatment with antipsychotic drugs is
medically appropriate.86 In addition, the Court proposed that due process
could also be satisfied if a state shows that a determination of a defendant's
guilt or innocence could not be achieved with means less intrusive than
antipsychotic medication. 7
However, in the instant case, the majority could find no evidence that the
district court balanced the relevant state interests against Riggins' liberty
interest when it refused to suspend Rigginis' treatment with Mellaril.88
Instead, the Court found that the district court weighed the risk that Riggins'
defense would be prejudiced by Riggins' demeanor under the influence of
Mellaril against the chance that Riggins would become incompetent if Mellaril
was discontinued. 9 The district court did not consider Riggins' right to be
free from unwanted medication, which is guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause;' therefore, Riggins' due process rights were violated.9'
The Court further reasoned that this violation tainted Riggins' conviction
because the drug may have adversely affected Riggins' right to a fair trial.'
The continued administration of Mellaril may have influenced Riggins'
demeanor as well as his abilities to testify on his own behalf, to follow the
proceedings, and to communicate effectively with counsel.93 On the basis of
the record, the majority recognized the futility of determining the actual effect

that continued treatment with Mellaril had on the outcome of Riggins' trial.94
However, from medical testimony, the Court concluded that a strong
possibility of prejudice to Riggins' defense remained. 9 Although the Court
noted that sometimes prejudice can be justified. by an essential state interest,

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1816.
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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the Court could find no such interest here.' Accordingly, the decision of the
Nevada Supreme Court was reversed and the case remanded.'
In a concurring opinion,98 Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that
Riggins' due process rights were violated by the involuntary administration of
Mellaril. 9 However, Kennedy concurred because he felt that the State's
underlying purpose in forcibly administering antipsychotic drugs was to insure
the defendant would be competent for trial."° Kennedy expressed his
concern that even if the State could satisfy due process by showing that
involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs was medically appropriate and
was necessary for the defendant's safety, trying a defendant who is under the
influence of antipsychotic drugs may be improper.'
Kennedy argued that in order to try a defendant who is under the
influence of antipsychotic drugs, a state would have to show that there was no
significant risk that the medication would prejudice the defendant's demeanor
or capacity to assist counsel in his defense."° But, due to the uncertain
nature of the effects of these drugs, as well as the possibility of seriously
harmful side effects, such a showing would be practically impossible. 3
Therefore, until the nature of these drugs is better understood, a state should
rely on civil commitment proceedings rather than tainting the integrity of the
judicial process by chemically inducing competency." °
The dissent' argued that even if a violation of Riggins' due process
rights had occurred,"°e a reversal of Riggins' criminal conviction was not

96. Id. at 1816-17.
97., Id. at 1817. On remand, the Nevada trial court will have to hold a hearing to determine

if there is overriding justification to involuntarily medicate Riggins before and during trial. Id.
at 1815. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent retrying a defendant who succeeds in
getting his first conviction set aside on appeal because of a legal error. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488
U.S. 33, 38 (1988).
98. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id at 1818.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 1820.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 1821 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. The dissent argued that no due process violation occurred because Riggins took the
medication voluntarily. Id. at 1823. The dissent noted that the district court only refused to
enjoin the further medication of Riggins, it did not order Riggins to be medicated. Id. at 1824
n.2. Therefore, the dissent asserted that Riggins could have voluntarily terminated the
medication. Id. at 1824. Furthermore, the dissent found that Riggins could not raise the issue

of any due process violation from involuntary medication before the United States Supreme
Court because he did not raise it in the courts below. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/4
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warranted."°7 The dissent first contended that there was no evidence that
Riggins received anything less than a full and fair trial."° Justice Thomas
asserted that the majority reversed the conviction based only on a probability
that the medication prejudiced Riggins at trial, but offered no explanation of
how the trial was actually unfair."° The dissent then stated that reversal of
a criminal conviction is an improper remedy for this due process violation." ° The dissent argued that under Harper"' Riggins' remedy for such
a violation should be a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
V. COMMENT
The precise holding of the Court in the instant case was only that the Due
Process Clause protects individuals against involuntary treatment with
antipsychotic drugs, unless the state shows the treatment is medically
appropriate and there is overriding justification for the medication 1 3 Due
to the narrow reach of this holding, the Court did not conclusively dictate the
substantive standards for judging the constitutionality of forced medication."' The majority suggested that the Due Process Clause would have
been satisfied if the State had showed that antipsychotic medication was
medically appropriate and that involuntary treatment with the drug was the
only means to obtain an adjudication of the defendant's guilt or innocence." 5 This suggestion is perhaps the most troubling aspect of the
majority decision, because it could allow a state to forcibly administer
antipsychotic medication to render an otherwise incompetent defendant
competent to stand trial." 6 Furthermore, the majority decision noted the
detrimental effects that antipsychotic medication may have on a defendant's
right to a fair trial, but failed to give a conclusive answer to how these effects
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1821.
Id
Id. at 1822.
Id. at 1824-25.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 217 (1990).

112. Riggins, 112 S.Ct. at 1825 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1815.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. The United States Supreme Court has held that the conviction of an accused while
incompetent violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). To be deemed
competent to stand trial an accused must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and... a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960). Many states have statutorily required the same level of competency using nearly
identical language. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 552.020(1) (1986); NEv. REV. STAT.

§ 178.400(2) (1989).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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should be handled in a subsequent trial. As Justice Kennedy commented, the
but failed to address what would have to be
Court remanded the case,
17
considered on remand
This section will criticize the proposal that involuntary antipsychotic
medication can be justified to establish competency to stand trial and propose
how the effects of antipsychotic medication should be handled by courts.
A. Competency To Stand Trial
In proposing the standard that involuntary antipsychotic drugs can be
used only if there are no less intrusive means to adjudicate a defendant's guilt
or innocence, the Court relied on the assertion that "[c]onstitutional power to
bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and
This language could be
prerequisite to social justice and peace."".
interpreted in several different ways. The Court may have only approved the
use of antipsychotic drugs as a kind of "psychological shackles and gag""' 9
to calm a defendant whose disruptive behavior makes an orderly trial
impractical. Indeed, the language the Court quoted was from Illinois v.
2' where the Court addressed-the rights of such a disruptive defenAllen,21
dant1
On the other hand, this language could be interpreted to allow forcible
administration of antipsychotic drugs to an incompetent defendant to render
the defendant competent to stand trial. Clearly, if a defendant were incompetent, there could be no adjudication of that defendant's guilt or innocence.
Lower courts, relying on the same language, have held that a state's interest
in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial outweighs any rights the
defendant had to avoid unwanted medication." These courts reasoned that
a state's interest in bringing the defendant to trial is essential to "the integrity
of the criminal justice system" and stands at the very core of a state's police
power. " Thus, when weighed against a defendant's interest in avoiding
unwanted medication, the balance favors the state. 4 This line of reasoning

117. Riggins, 112 S.Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 1815 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, L,

concurring)).
119. People v. Parsons, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
120. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
121. Id. at 343-47.
122. See, e.g., Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160 (D.C. 1992); People v. Hardesty, 362
N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), appeal dismissed,477 U.S. 902 (1986); State v. Law, 244
S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1978); State v. Lover, 707 P.2d 1351 (Wash. CL App. 1985).
123. Hardesty,362 N.W.2d at 793 (quoting Bruce J.Winick, PsychotropicMedication and
Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.769, 812-13).
124. Id.
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concludes that anything less would constitute an "atavistic repudiation of the
advances made in the treatment of the mentally ill during the past two
decades.""n
However, it seems inconsistent with a "scheme of ordered liberty" that a
defendant could possibly be found to be incompetent to decide what type of
medical treatment is in his or her best interest and be forced to take potentially
dangerous medication, but, as a result of that involuntary medical treatment,
be rendered competent to stand trial and possibly be sentencedto death. Other
courts have questioned whether using antipsychotic drugs to make an
otherwise incompetent criminal defendant competent is an acceptable
justification for involuntary medication.
For example, in Bee v. Greaves,26 the court doubted whether a state's
interest in keeping a defendant competent to trial justified forcible medication. 27 The court stated that due to the potentially dangerous side effects
of antipsychotic drugs, any "state interest unrelated to the well being of the
individual or those around him simply has no relevance .... The needs of the
individual, not the requirements of the prosecutor, must be paramount where
the use of antipsychotic drugs is concerned."" 8 Similarly, in United States
v. Charters,"9 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit gave three
reasons for rejecting the notion that establishing competency though chemical
means justifies forced medication. First, a state would be subjecting a
defendant to the risk of harm from the effects of the drugs without any
Secondly, a
guarantee the drugs would make the defendant competent.'
state's interest encompasses more than bringing the defendant to trial-the
state must conduct a "fair trial in which the accused's guilt or innocence is
Due to the effects of the drugs on the defendant,
correctly determined."'
a fair trial would be unlikely.'
Finally, although the government has an
interest in determining the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant, "[that]
interest does not permit... a draconian invasion of the individual's freedom
and the risk of permanent physical injury. ' .
Unfortunately the Riggins Court failed to resolve whether rendering a
defendant competent to stand trial justifies forcible medication. The Court

125. People v. Parsons, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (Nassau Co. Ct. 1975).

126. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
127. Il at 1395.
128. Id.

129. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), on reh'g,863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.denied, 494
U.S. 1016 (1990).

130. Id. at 493.
131. Id. at 493-94.
132. Id See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text for a detailed examination of how

the antipsychotic drugs may affect a defendant's right to a fair trial.
133. Charters,829 F.2d at 494.
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explicitly refused to answer whether a competent criminal defendant may
refuse antipsychotic medication if termination of medication would render him
incompetent at trial, because there was no evidence that Riggins would be
incompetent without the medication.'
This hesitation may indicate an
unwillingness to allow competency to be involuntarily established by
medication. It remains unclear whether antipsychotic drugs can be justified
by showing that the defendant would otherwise be incompetent to stand trial,
but there are strong reasons for not giving a state this power.

B. Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs at Trial
If involuntary medication is permitted to make a defendant competent to
stand trial, antipsychotic drugs can substantially affect a defendant's trial in
many ways. Most significantly, this medication can affect the demeanor of
the defendant at trial. Antipsychotic drugs may produce a defendant who is
unable to remain still, maintains a mask-like face, does not respond to
testimony, and cannot project his innocence to the jury. 3 '
In every criminal trial, but especially in one where the defendant raises
the insanity defense, the accused's demeanor is highly relevant to the jury's
eventual verdict. In Riggins, Justice Kennedy noted that "[a]t all stages of the
proceedings, the defendant's behavior, manner, facial expressions, and
emotional responses, or their absence, combine to make an overall impression
on the trier of fact, an impression that can have a powerful influence on the
outcome of the trial."'36 If the defendant appears calm and controlled at
trial due to the effects of the drugs, the jury may not find any indication of
insanity. 7 Additionally,
[i]f the state may administer tranquilizers to a defendant who objects, the
state then is, in effect, permitted to determine what the jury will see or not
see of the defendant's case by medically altering the attitude, appearance
they are relevant to the jury's
and demeanor of the defendant, when
38
consideration of his mental condition.
In addition to a defendant's demeanor, antipsychotic drugs may also
affect the defendant's desire to defend himself appropriately. A defendant
under the influence of drugs may be competent to stand trial, but may not care

134. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.

135. Linda C.Fentiman, Whose Right isitAnyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial
in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1130-33

(1986).
concurring).
136. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J.,
137. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983).
138. State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/4

14

Doherty: Doherty: Antipsychotic Medication and the Criminal Defendant

1993]

ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION

about the outcome of the trial. These drugs may make a defendant apathetic
and unconcerned about the criminal proceedings and therefore less likely to
present a vigorous defense.' As one commentator writes: "A defendant
who is apathetic and distracted, whose defensive instincts are not keen, and
who unquestioningly accepts the statements of the prosecution and the
witnesses against him will not be able to exercise
his right of presence and
40
cross-examination in an effective manner."
Early decisions from courts which approved trying a defendant under the
influence of antipsychotic drugs failed to recognize the possible effects of the
drugs on a defendant during trial.'
However, in In re Pray," the
Vermont Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction because the jury
was not informed that the defendant was under the influence of antipsychotic
medication."
As a result, courts have considered several options to
mitigate any prejudicial effects of antipsychotic drugs on a defendant at trial.
In State v. Law,'" the South Carolina Supreme Court held that medical
testimony about the nature of antipsychotic drugs and their effect on the
defendant was an acceptable substitute for the defendant's natural behavior
without antipsychotic drugs.'45 This procedure was approved by the Nevada

Supreme Court in the instant case. 6 However, other courts have noted that
the effects of antipsychotic drugs cannot be adequately described through
expert medical testimony or jury instructions. 47 These courts have
questioned whether medical testimony is an effective substitute for the
defendant's natural demeanor without the influence of antipsychotic drugs.'
Another defect of medical testimony is that there is no medical consensus
about the effects of antipsychotic drugs on a particular defendant. This
problem is perhaps best illustrated by the medical testimony in the Riggins

139. Fentiman, supranote 135, at 1132-33.
140. Tomashefsky, supra note 3, at 784.
141. See, e.g., People v. Dalfonso, 321 N.E.2d 379 (I11.App. Ct. 1974); State v. Hampton,
218 So. 2d 311 (La. 1969); State v. Plaisance, 210 So. 2d 323 (La.), cert.denied,393 U.S. 1005
(1968); People v. Parsons, 372 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Nassau Co. Ct. 1975); State v. Potter, 204 S.E.2d
649 (N.C. 1974); State v. Rand, 247 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); State v. Amdt, 465 P.2d
486 (Or. CL App. 1970); State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).
142. 336 A.2d 174 (Vt. 1975).
143. Id. at 177.
144. 244 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1978).

145. Id. at 306.
146. Riggins, 808 P.2d at 538.
147. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437 (Mass. 1983); State v. Hayes, 389
A.2d 1379 (N.H. 1978).

148. Louraine,453 N.E.2d at 442; see also Hayes, 389 A.2d at 1381 (defendant has right
to request that the jury views him without medication).
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case. 49 One psychiatrist testified that "[i]f you take a lot of [antipsychotic
medication] you become stoned for all practical purposes and can barely
function.' 15 However, other testimony indicated that antipsychotic drugs
"may have increased Riggins' cognitive ability."''
An alternative to expert testimony would be a jury instruction to inform
the jury about the nature of the drugs and their effect on the defendant's
demeanor throughout trial." 2 In fact, the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure require that a jury be told of the possible effects of'antipsychotic
drugs on a defendant who is being administered them during trial. 3 The
Florida rules require such instruction both at the beginning of a trial and
during the final charge to the jury." However, the mere use of a jury

instruction raises serious questions whether the jury will adequately consider
the effects of the drugs and not be prejudiced by the defendant's demeanor
throughout trial. 55
Another alternative would be to show the jury a videotape of the
defendant in an unmedicated state." 6 This suggestion has been criticized
because only "one small glimpse" of a defendant's natural demeanor would
not outweigh the jury's view of the defendant in a medicated state for the vast
majority of the trial. 7
A more drastic alternative would allow the defendant to be tried free
from antipsychotic medication, provided that the defendant waives his right
to not be tried while incompetent, if withdrawal of the medication would
render the defendant incompetent to stand trial." 8 This would seem to
satisfy the state's interest in bringing a defendant to trial as well as allowing

149. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted the lack of certain knowledge of
antipsychotic drugs and their side effects. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1823 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 808 P.2d 535, 540

(Nev. 1991) (Rose, J., concurring)).
152. See, e.g., People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), appeal
dismissed,477 U.S. 902 (1986).

153. FLA. P, CRim. PRO. 3.215 (1988).
154. Id.
155. Fentiman, supranote 135, at 1134 ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can
be overcome by instruction to the jury,... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction.") (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 226 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J.,

concurring)).
156. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d at 798 (Borman, J., concurring).
157. Fentiman, supranote 135, at 1135-36.
158. See id. at 1164-69. This option was also considered, but rejected in Bruce J.Winick,
PsychotropicMedicationand Competence to Stand Trial,1977 AM. B.FOUND. REs. J.769, 814.
The possibility of such a waiver was also briefly mentioned in some case decisions. See
Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437,444 n.13 (Mass. 1983); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d

1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978); State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
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the defendant to exhibit his unmedicated demeanor to the jury.'59 While this
proposal may ostensibly seem unconstitutional, it has also received some
critical support." °
While temporarily under the influence of medication before trial and
therefore competent, the defendant can be instructed as to the nature of the
charges against him, the nature of the trial proceedings, and the possible
punishment involved.' 6 ' The defendant can also inform his attorney of any
relevant exculpatory evidence so they can form an effective trial strategy.162
Then, great care would have to be taken to ensure the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waives his right not to be tried while incompetent. 63

Before the trial starts, the defendant can be taken off medication so the jury
can observe the defendant in an unmedicated state.
However, waiving the right not to be tried while incompetent is fraught
with perils. In his concurrence in Riggins, Justice Kennedy doubted that such
a waiver could withstand scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.'" He
stated, "A defendant's waiver of the right to be tried while competent would
cast doubt on his exercise or waiver of all subsequent rights and privileges
through the whole course of the trial."'65 For example, an unmedicated
defendant may not be able to follow or challenge opposing testimony.'6
Also, an unmedicated defendant could become violent or disruptive during
trial, thereby prejudicing the whole trial. 6
While such behavior may
support the insanity defense, the defendant is waiving important trial rights
only to give the jury an opportunity to observe his unmedicated demeanor.
In addition to possibly violating the defendant's due process rights,
permitting such a waiver may not be in the state's best interest.
One
commentator argues that "the state has its own interest in the accuracy,
dignity, and apparent fairness of the criminal process-compelling state
interests that might be jeopardized by the trial of a defendant deprived of

159. Fentiman, supra note 135, at 1167.
160. Id. at 1164-69. This kind of waiver was approved by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in Hayes, 389 A.2d at 1382. Both the Massachusetts Supreme Court and the Superior
Court of New Jersey approved of this language from Hayes without comment. Louraine, 453
N.E.2d at 444 n.13; State v. Otero, 570 A.2d 503, 506 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
161. Fentiman, supra note 135, at 1164-65.
162. Id. at 1165.
163. See Hayes, 389 A.2d at 1382; Fentiman, supranote 135, at 1166-67 (both stressing
the importance that the defendant fully understands the legal effect of waiving this right).
164. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 1817-18.
166. Id
167. Fentiman, supra note 135, at 1167.
168. Winick, supra note 158, at 814.
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competence by his decision to discontinue drugs. 1' 69 From both the
defendant's and the state's perspective, the constitutionality of allowing a
defendant to waive his or her right not to be tried if incompetent can be
seriously questioned.
Unfortunately, none of these attempts to compensate defendants who are
tried while forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs are satisfactory. The
possibility of prejudice due to the effects of antipsychotic drugs cannot be
completely removed. The Court stated in Ake v. Oklahoma70 that "[a] state
may not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage
over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the
accuracy of the verdict obtained." ' Accordingly, states must adopt stronger
precautionary procedures to ensure that the effects of antipsychotic drugs do
not adversely affect a defendant at trial.
One possible solution would be to change the standard for incompetency
in the case of defendants under the influence of antipsychotic drugs."' The
requirement of competency can be attributed to the nature of the adversarial
trial system."
For the adversary system to operate effectively, one side
must be able to oppose the other. An incompetent defendant is not capable
of opposing the prosecution effectively. As one author writes:
[incompetent persons] are not really present at trial; they may not be able
properly to play the role of an accused person, to recall relevant events, to
produce evidence and witnesses, to testify effectively on their own behalf,
to help confront hostile
witnesses, and to project to the trier of facts a sense
74
of their innocence.1
Similarly, a defendant who is forced to take antipsychotic drugs may face
these kinds of inequities even though he is deemed competent under the
traditional standard of competency. 75 A defendant who is involuntarily
under the influence of antipsychotic drugs may encounter the same problems
in effectively opposing the prosecution as an incompetent defendant because
of the effects of the medication during trial. 76 Therefore, a different

169. Id.
170. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
171. Id. at 79.

172. See Tomashefsky, supranote 3, at 790 (proposing that the standard for competency

include the minimum level of cognition as well as arequirement that other mental processes must
be restored before a defendant is deemed fit to stand trial).
173. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975).
174. NORvAL MORRIS, MADNEss AND THE CRIMAL LAW 37 (1982).
175. See supra note 116 for the traditional standard of competency.
176. See supranotes 7-12, 135-40 and accompanying text.
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standard of competency should be used when determining if a defendant who
is medicated with antipsychotic drugs is competent to stand trial.
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested what amounts to a higher
standard of competency for defendants taking antipsychotic drugs. He argued
that a defendant under the influence of antipsychotic drugs could be tried only
if there is "no significant risk that the medication will impair or alter in any
material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to the testimony
at trial or to assist his counsel.""' This standard is sufficient to protect
defendants who are tried while involuntarily receiving antipsychotic medication, because it recognizes that antipsychotic medication can adversely affect
a defendant at trial in addition to making that defendant competent. Because
there is no medical consensus about the actual effects of antipsychotic drugs,
Kennedy realized that a court can never be certain how significantly
antipsychotic drugs affect a defendant's ability to assist in his own defense,
and thus, that his proposed standard may never be satisfied." 8 Until
medical knowledge advances, Kennedy suggested that an incompetent
defendant should be involuntarily committed rather than tainting the trial
process by forcibly treating a defendant with antipsychotic drugs to render that
defendant competent to stand trial.'79
Justice Kennedy's solution is the most attractive alternative because it
recognizes that although the state has an interest in trying those accused of a
crime, that interest is outweighed by the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Neither jury instructions, expert testimony, nor a videotape of an unmedicated
defendant are adequate protection against possible prejudice to the defendant
because of the effects of antipsychotic medication.'
Similarly, trying an
unmedicated defendant who has waived his right not to be tried if incompetent
can prejudice the defense in other ways.'
Therefore, the only acceptable
solution is to allow the use of antipsychotic medication at trial only if there
is no risk that the drugs will affect the defendant's right to a fair trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Riggins v. Nevada the United States Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause protects criminal defendants against involuntary administration
of antipsychotic drugs unless a state can show an overriding justification for
such medication. However, due to this narrow holding, the Court failed to
answer other significant questions raised by the involuntary medication of a

177. Riggins, 112 S.Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 1819.
Id. at 1820.
See supra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
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defendant. The Court did not discuss whether rendering an incompetent
defendant competent to stand trial justifies involuntary medication. The Court
'also did not address how the effects of antipsychotic drugs on the demeanor
of a defendant during trial should be dealt with procedurally. The Court
remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing many of the
complex problems that remain.
BRIAN J. DOHERTY
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